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Abstract—An increasing number of mobile applications and
services require that devices are aware of their location. Global
Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are the predominant en-
abling technology. But location information provided by com-
mercial GNSS is not secure, unlike what is the usual assumption.
There are only few exceptions in the literature that present
GNSS vulnerabilities. In this paper, we contribute the first
detailed quantitative analysis of attacks against GNSS-based
localization. We show how replay attacks against GNSS can have a
significant impact: even against cryptographically secured GNSS
instantiations, an adversary can manipulate the location and time
calculated by victim GNSS receivers. We explain in detail how
such attacks can be mounted, measure their impact, and discuss
the effectiveness of possible countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION
A plethora of mobile devices require knowledge of own
position or position of other devices in the system. Exam-
ples include sensors reporting environmental measurements,
cellular telephones or portable digital assistants (PDAs) and
other portable computers, embedded mobile platforms as those
in Vehicular Communication (VC) systems, and merchandize
(container) and fleet (truck) management systems. In these
cases, mobile devices determine their own position, and other
system entities determine the position of the mobile devices.
These two aspects are the two main categories of positioning
(localization) problems. In this paper, we are concerned with
the former, the determination of own position; more specifi-
cally, we consider Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS)
as the enabling localization technology, since GNSS receivers
are used in numerous and diverse applications.
The Global Positioning System (GPS), its Russian coun-
terpart (GLONAS), and the upcoming European GALILEO
system transmit signals bearing reference information from
a constellation of satellites. Any receiving device, V , with
the appropriate equipment can decode the signals and utilize
the GNSS information to determine its own location, locV .
However, publicly known wireless transmission and reception
methods for GNSS signals and message content create a vul-
nerability. They open the door to system abuse by an adversary
that interferes with and injects fictitious GNSS transmissions,
and this way manipulates locV and eventually V ’s operation.
For example, consider an attack against a fleet management
system, with trucks traveling across a continent, e.g., Europe,
equipped with GPS and reporting periodically their location
via a cellular telephone data link to a central server. If the
adversary wishes to physically attack a specific truck with a
GNSS receiver V , it can transmit forged GPS signals in the
vicinity of V , cause a false locV to be calculated and then
reported, and mislead the fleet management system about the
actual location of its truck. In a different setting, an adversary
could affect the navigation systems running nowadays on many
(private and public) vehicles, disrupt the routes drivers are
provided with, and eventually degrade the efficiency and safety
of the transportation system.
Such attacks exploiting the vulnerability of commercial
GNSS positioning can have serious consequences. With the
increasing popularity of those systems, it is very important to
analyze and thwart GNSS abuse. In this paper, we investigate
exactly this problem, notably, the impact of such attacks and
possible ways to mitigate them. A few works only considered
the GNSS vulnerability, discussed in [4], [7], and countermea-
sures are proposed in [3], [6], [8]. Our contribution here is
two-fold: We provide a quantitative analysis of attacks through
detailed simulations, and we identify the significance of replay
attacks, a class of relatively simple to implement attacks that
can be mounted even against future cryptographically protected
systems. We emphasize that to this date, commercial GNSS
systems do not provide authentication services; this is a feature
of the upcoming GALILEO system.
In the rest of the paper, we first provide an overview of
basic GNSS characteristics and outline attack types in Sec. II.
We describe security mechanisms considered in the literature
in Sec. III. Then, in Sec. IV, we explain the specifics of replay
attacks and in particular why they can be successful in spite
of cryptographic protection. Before we conclude, we discuss
in Sec. VI the effectiveness of several mechanisms to protect
GNSS receivers.
II. VULNERABILITY OF GNSS SIGNALS
A. GNSS overview
Each receiver is able to receive simultaneously a set of nav-
igation messages, one NAVi message from each satellite Si
in the visible satellite constellation. Each satellite is assigned
an a priori publicly known unique spreading code ci. The
NAVi enable each receiver V to determine its own position,
locV = (XV , YV , ZV ), in a Cartesian system, as well as a
time correction offset, tV , to add to its local clock value in
order to maintain the current global time. At least four satellites
should be visible so that V can compute locV and tV , with the
two quantities together termed the PVT or navigation solution.
The computation at the receiver relies on pseudo-range values
it estimates, one per visible satellite Si: the pseudo-range ρi
978-1-4244-1948-7/08/$25.00 c© 2008 IEEE IWSSC 2008
Authorized licensed use limited to: EPFL LAUSANNE. Downloaded on January 16, 2009 at 13:42 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
is the Si-V distance estimate, based on the satellite signal
propagation delay. This is calculated as the difference of V ’s
local clock at reception time, minus the time at which NAVi
was transmitted, provided by Si as a field in NAVi. For each
pseudo-range ρi, one equation is formed:
ρi = |si − locV |+ c · tV (1)
The position, si, of satellite Si is obtained from the NAVi
message, and c is the speed of light. With a system of at least
four equations, V obtains the PVT solution [1].
B. Attacking GNSS
The essence of the attacks against commercial GNSS lies
in that the satellites’ spreading codes are publicly known. This
allows an adversary to construct a transmitter of signals iden-
tical to those sent by a satellite. The objective of the adversary
would then be to forge NAV messages, transmit them over an
area with one or more receivers, and this way manipulate their
PVT solutions. Nonetheless, with GNSS signals being widely
(essentially, globally) available, the adversary should first force
its victim receivers to loose their “lock” on legitimate GNSS
signals and then “lock” on the adversary’s forged signals.
To mount such an attack, the adversary should act essen-
tially in two stages. First, it should jam the GNSS signals, to
force receivers to loose contact with the satellites, and then
transmit its forged messages. The latter is termed a spoofing
or a meaconing attack, depending on whether the adversary
synthesizes its transmissions or “re-uses” (parts of) legitimate
GNSS transmissions.
The adversary could mount the second and essential stage
of its attack even without forcing receivers to loose their “lock”
to GNSS signals. This would be possible when there are gaps
in GNSS coverage, that is, areas where V cannot lock on
more than three satellites. This may occur often in urban
environments and in general due to obstacles that cause loss
of GNSS signals. We do not dwell on this case, as loss of
satellite signals is not under the control of the attacker.
Jamming The attacker transmits with sufficiently high
power in the GNSS frequency band. This deliberate interfer-
ence forces receivers to “unlock,” i.e., loose contact with the
otherwise visible satellite signals. A jammer is a simple, low-
cost yet very effective device. For example, with 1 Watt of
transmission power, reception of GNSS signals is prevented
approximately within a radius of 35 km from the jammer.
Spoofing signals can be generated by satellite simulators,
equipment which is available today. The received power of
the spoofing signal should exceed that of the legitimate signal;
this being essentially a form of jamming. The receiver then
operates with the forged signal as input and computes the
location induced by the spoofer. For example, it could “invert”
the navigation solution it wishes to impose, estimating the
si positions of the satellite constellation, and then set the
corresponding NAV message values. Beyond falsifying the
time of the week number (ToE) (to influence the receiver’s
clock) or the almanac data, the adversary can perform more
subtle manipulations of NAV message parameters such as the
mean anomaly at reference time (Mo), which describes the
angular offset between the satellite position at reference time
and perigee, or the eccentricity e and the rate of right ascension
(Ω) [9]. Alternatively, spoofed signals can be generated based
on previously received GNSS signals: the adversary records
NAV messages and re-transmits them or it synthesizes new
messages with their parts. This attack, termed meaconing, is
in the class of replay attacks that we explain in further detail
in Sec. IV.
III. SECURING GNSS SIGNALS
Authentication and integrity protection of NAV messages
have emerged as defense mechanisms. Authentication would
ensure that NAV messages generated only by GNSS entities
are accepted at and used by receivers to determine the PVT
solution. Integrity would ensure that modification or utilization
of parts of NAV messages towards spoofing or meaconing is
not possible either. Next, we discuss different approaches for
cryptographic protection.
Symmetric key cryptography, with one secret key shared
by the GNSS and each receiver, is impractical: NAV messages
would need to be authenticated for each of the many millions
of receivers individually. On the other hand, a single, system-
wide symmetric key, shared with all receivers would be very
efficient but also very weak. The entire system security would
be in jeopardy, as it suffices for the adversary to compromise
the system key (e.g., physically read out from one receiver) and
then launch spoofing attacks at will. Making GNSS receivers
tamper-resistant currently appears very costly for commercial
devices.
Asymmetric or public key cryptography appears as a viable
choice given the problem constraints. The GNSS obtains pairs
of private and public keys, ki and Ki respectively, one pair
per satellite, with each Ki bound to Si via a certificate. Each
receiver obtains all certified Ki for all GNSS satellites. Each
satellite digitally signs with ki its NAV messages. This service,
termed Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) [5], will be
available in GALILEO.
To further enhance protection against meaconing, a different
public-key NMA approach was proposed in [3]. To thwart
replay attacks, each Si chooses a secret spreading code for each
NAV message. But it discloses this to receivers, along with a
hidden timing marker, in a delayed and authenticated manner.
If nodes can maintain accurate clocks by means other than
the GNSS methods, they can safely detect messages that are
replayed between the time of their creation and their spreading
code disclosure. A similar idea using secret spreading codes
(SSCs) is presented in [8].
IV. REVISITING THE GNSS VULNERABILITY: REPLAY
ATTACKS
With the upcoming NMA and future GNSS security, it is
still possible for an adversary to manipulate the receiver’s
PVT solution. NMA can thwart forgery but it cannot prevent
replay attacks, a a general class of attacks. The adversary can
receive legitimate GNSS signals (and thus NAV messages),
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record them, and transmit them at a later point in time and at
a different point in space. This is possible because, essentially,
cryptography ensures the authenticity and integrity of messages
but cannot ensure signal authenticity: a message can be re-
transmitted by any radio other than the one of the message
originator.
We illustrate a replay attack in Fig. 1. In general, the
adversary can start recording the GNSS frequency band after
the beginning of the navigation message is detected. This
is done thanks to a preamble in the form of an 10001011
sequence of bits. The adversary needs to detect at least the
first bit of the preamble; this can be done after a period of
τ = 20ms, the transmission delay for one 1 bit with the
GNSS bit-rate of 50 bps.1 After that, the adversary can start
replaying recorded signals, with any additional treplay ≥ 0
delay it chooses. The victim receiver(s) will start receiving the
replayed NAV messages after some adversary-victim specific
signal propagation delay (usually negligible) and one more bit
transmission time.
Received GNSS signal delayed
Transmit after ? + t replay
NAV message buffering
Preamble
detection
Victim receiver
V
Total
delay
? + t replay
Adversary
Fig. 1. Illustration of a replay attack: τ is the minimum processing time
to detect a NAV message, and treplay is additional delay imposed by the
attacker.
treplay is an essential characteristic of the replay attack. It
allows the adversary to control the “shift” of the PVT solution
it induces. Looking at the signals from each Si separately,
each millisecond of treplay translates approximately to 300m
of erroneous (induced by the adversary) Si-V distance offset:
the receiver of the replayed signal will have an erroneous ρi
estimate, 300m longer than the actual one, as radio signals
propagate with the speed of light, c. This is exactly why the
PVT solution of V will be affected. The adversary can have
the choice of which Si signals to replay and the choice of
a treplay value for each one. If it replays all NAV messages
“blindly” (the entire band, as explained below), it induces the
same treplay to all NAVi. The received signal I component
after a replay could be represented as:
SL1 = αCA(t− treplay)D(t)sin(ft + φ) (2)
In Eq.(2), α represents the amplitude of the signal, f the
transmitted frequency, φ is the received phase, CA is the C/A
1This is the GPS bit rate. For GALILEO, with rate of 250 bps, the delay
would be 4ms.
code and D(t) is the navigation message. Given the crypto-
graphic protection, D cannot be modified by the adversary.
Nonetheless, even though this is not necessary for replay at-
tacks, the adversary has control over α and thus, to a significant
extent, the received power at V . It also controls f and this
way can affect the phase and thus the received signal Doppler
offset. We do not consider those actions in further detail here.
We note, however, that this relates more generally with the
sophistication of the adversary’s equipment. For example, the
more transceivers it has and the more closely matching signals
to the original GNSS they produce, the more effective it can
be in targeting a specific victim receiver. Adversaries with
different sophistication levels will be considered in our future
investigations.
Another main characteristic of replay attacks is the method
of GNSS reception, which enables replaying. This can be
done at the message or symbol level or it can be done by
recording the GNSS frequency band and replaying it without
de-spreading the GNSS signals. The latter, more involved and
thus costly, would enable the attacker to mount an attack
against the delayed-disclosure secret spreading code approach,
as pointed out in [3]. But this additional feature, which
essentially implies a stronger adversary instantiation, would
be necessary for low treplay values. In contrast, this is not
necessary for long treplay values, after the de-spreading code
for the hidden marker is disclosed. A high treplay allows the
adversary to circumvent the delayed disclosure approach, for
example, after a prolonged period of jamming or benign loss
of satellite signals, or after a “cold start,” that is, when the
receiver boots after a long period of no operation and thus no
memory of its clock and location.
V. EVALUATION OF ATTACK FEASIBILITY AND IMPACT
A. Simulation Setup and Rationale
In order to evaluate the impact of attacks, we perform
a detailed simulation of the system, implementing the basic
software functionality of the GPS receiver, and simulating the
satellite trajectories in Matlab. We calibrate the simulation
environment with raw data from a JPS receiver in RINEX
format [11]. We implement jamming of the victim receivers
followed by spoofing and replay attacks. We consider only
the portion of the network area under the influence of the
attacker, and thus the area at which spoofed or replayed GNSS
signals are the ones mobile receivers lock on to. We consider
a three-dimensional area for receivers, and various mobility
models. For the results shown here, the positions of receivers
are updated every second, for a total simulation time of 300
seconds. The receiver velocity v changes at each time step
t, with a component randomly drawn from an interval added
to vX , vY , and vZ .2 We model benign errors, due to multi-
path, ionosphere delay, and other random errors in signal
propagation, which cause pseudo-range estimation errors and
2The random component added at each time step, for the results shown
here, is in [−5, 5] km/h for each component. Choosing the initial velocity
and the limits for each component, we can control the level of mobility. For
example, for high mobility, vX , vY in [55, 185] and vZ in [15, 30].
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Fig. 2. Replay attack induced location offset for the locV of a victim receiver
V : example actual and spoofed trajectories projected on the X-Y plane.
thus errors in the navigation solution, via a Weibull distribution
with shape factor b = 2; a randomly drawn factor is added to
each coordinate of locV independently [10].
We measure the impact of each attack in terms of the
location offset the attack causes to the navigation solution,
with respect to the actual location of the victim receiver.
Since spoofing can be thwarted with cryptographic protection
(NMA), and due to space limitations, we do not present here
results on their impact. Rather, we focus on the impact of
replay attacks. Our objective is to investigate and show the
feasibility of fine-grained replay attacks. The reason is that
in practice very large location offsets could be detected, as
discussed in Sec. VI.
We implement the relaying attack as described in Sec. IV,
controlling the treplay imposed by the adversary. The remain-
ing components of delay, including τ = 20ms, between the
original NAV transmission and reception at the victim are not
under the control of the adversary. It is possible that practical
equipment constraints could restrict treplay ≥ tminreplay > 0. We
allow adversary to add treplay ∈ [1, 200]ms. The adversary can
either use the same treplay for all the NAV signals it replays
(a case that also corresponds to replaying the spread signals),
or it can utilize different treplay values for each NAVi. We
vary treplay in steps of 1ms. We also let the adversary choose
treplay randomly for each NAVi. For the results shown here,
signals from all visible satellites are replayed (and delayed).
We experimented with adversaries that replay a subset of
visible signals, with the difference explained in Section V-B.
B. Results
Fig. 2 illustrates the actual trajectory of a mobile receiver
versus the spoofed trajectory, which is induced by a replay
attack with treplay = 20ms; for easier inspection, we project
the trajectories on the X − Y plane. We see the discrepancy
increasing, after 300 seconds of simulation, ending up with a
location offset of 12 km. It is interesting to see that a subtle
attack, in the sense that initially the location offset as well as
the time offset tV are low, results gradually in a significant
“displacement” of the victim receiver.
Next we investigate the impact of the replay attack as a
function of treplay , looking at the location offset, for each of
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Fig. 3. Replay attack induced location offset for each of the locV coordinates
(XV , YV , ZV ) of a victim receiver V .
the coordinates (XV , YV , ZV ) of locV . Intuitively, the larger
the delay, the larger the offset. This is verified by Fig. 3, which
shows a significant offset increase with treplay . We see that
XV , YV , ZV have different error sensitivity; for example, YV
and ZV change at the rate of few meters to tenths of meters per
second, while XV changes are much lower. We emphasize that
the error (offset) sensitivity per coordinate can vary in different
ways, beyond what is shown in Fig. 3, as there is a geometric
dependence, to specific ephemeris data and the satellites and
receiver positions. We observed overall that the location offset
increases with treplay; we let the detailed investigation of per
coordinate sensitivity as future work.
We finally show results for the adversary that introduces a
random treplay per satellite NAV message, randomly chosen
here from the [1, 20]ms interval. Fig. 4 shows the resultant
locations, given an actual position, as a “cloud” of points, and
Fig. 5 shows the effect (offset) for each Cartesian coordinate
XV , YV , ZV over (simulation) time. We observe a sharp
difference with the homogeneous replay attack, which caused
location offsets in order of meters (for one NAV message). In
contrast, the randomized replay attack, even with low treplay
values, can severely distort the perceived satellite geometry,
and thus create location offsets in the order of hundreds of
kilometers (e.g., 500 km). We note here that we experimented
with replay attacks that manipulated signals from subsets of
satellites, but we do not present those here due to space lim-
itations. Thanks to the least-squares PVT solution, replaying
for example two or three signals causes lower location offsets.
VI. TOWARDS THWARTING THE GNSS VULNERABILITY
As replay attacks allow the adversary to manipulate locV
for any receiver V in the area its signals overwrite GNSS
signals, defense mechanisms are necessary to detect the onset
of an attack. In other words, after V enters the area under
adversarial control, it should be able to detect whether the
locV it calculates is the result of the attack. We consider the
following basic approach: when the receiver has an indication
of an attack, for example, GNSS unavailability or, possibly,
jamming detection, it controls the plausibility of the PVT
solution once it “locks on” to GNSS signals again. We propose
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nals: attack-induced offsets for each of the locV coordinates (XV , YV , ZV )
over part of a simulation trace.
doing this primarily by controlling if the PVT “fits in” with
previous location and time values, known to the receiver when
there were no indications of an attack.
We propose simple tests to “filter out” replayed messages.
V can control if the propagation delay for the ρi equations falls
in the range of approximately 67 to 87ms, which correspond
to the satellite orbits from 20, 000 to 26, 000km. Of course,
the adversary could choose treplay such that the resultant total
propagation delay estimate remains in the 67 − 87ms range.
Moreover, the receiver can loosely detect replayed signals by
comparing the approximate information in the almanac with
the visible satellites: it can detect an attack if there is a
mismatch. Again, an adversary of relatively low sophistication
could avoid replaying signals of satellites that contradict the
almanac.
Regarding memory-based tests, the receiver applies es-
sentially an approach that resembles Receiver Autonomous
Inertial Mechanisms (RAIMs). Using past locations, before
the suspected attack, it predicts its location. Taking into
consideration statistical prediction errors, which increase with
the period of disconnection, it compares the suspected locV
with the predicted one. It detects an attack if the PVT locV
falls outside the error margins of the predicted value. Similarly,
the receiver clock can remain relatively stable even without the
PVT-based synchronization. A replay attack causing a high tV
value, outside the maximum receiver clock drift margins, can
be detected this way.
We emphasize that these techniques are not effective if the
receiver has no memory of time or location, e.g., when it
boots after a long period of being non-operational (cold start).
Nonetheless, they can be effective for a significant fraction of
attacks. We will investigate those further, as well techniques
that can mitigate attacks perpetrated during cold start in future
work.
VII. CONCLUSION
Existing GNSS receivers are vulnerable to a range of
attacks that manipulate their computed location. We identify
a fundamental GNSS vulnerability to replay attacks, even
if GNSS were cryptographically protected. Our quantitative
analysis, based on a detailed simulation framework, shows
that fine-grained replaying attacks can be performed, so that
gradual manipulation of the victim location can remain un-
detected. But, cumulatively, those small manipulations can
lead to a substantial displacement of the victim over a period
of time. Without any compromise, physical or not, of the
GNSS receiver or other equipment related to the location-
aware application, the adversary can attack the system; for
example, a cargo can be stolen while in a location away from
its believed one. It is important to note that replay attacks
can exploit the GNSS functionality without compromise of the
GNSS receiver or other node on-board equipment or node-to-
node communication. We discuss replay attacks against dif-
ferent future NMA-secured GNSS, with attackers of differing
sophistication.
As part of on-going and future work, we intent to further
refine and generalize our simulation framework, present ad-
ditional details on the impact of attacks, considering more
closely the cost of attacks of differing sophistication levels
through proof-of-concept implementations, and develop further
countermeasures and evaluate their effectiveness.
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